![]() The story of the Max is ultimately the story of the Darwinian business cycle where mature companies like Boeing face constant threats from new products, new competitors, and the search for new growth. Those errors came to a terrible and deadly climax in the skies above the Java Sea in October 2018 and above the Ethiopian countryside five months later. What emerged was a story of cascading failure - the many small human errors at every phase of the airplane’s design, certification, and operation process. The Verge spoke to a dozen pilots, instructors, engineers, and experts about the 737 Max and its development, rollout, and the two crashes that have claimed the lives of 346 people. What could have brought down one of Boeing’s newest, most technologically sophisticated airplanes? But those closer to the airplane’s development knew better: there had been warning signs from the start. It was the first 737 Max accident in its 18 months of service. PK-LQP may have reached 600 mph, faster than a Tomahawk missile, as it plunged into the water. This time, there was no third pilot to help the flight crew. And it relentlessly activated its automatic pitch trim in the nose-down direction 28 times over the course of eight minutes. ![]() ![]() ![]() It dove just after the flight crew retracted the flaps. It threw multiple errors on the flight display. Its stick shaker activated just after takeoff. The following morning, PK-LQP, operating as Lion Air flight 610, took off at 6:20AM local time on its way to Pangkal Pinang, Indonesia. Following standard procedure, the captain reported the episode to the airline, and the airline’s maintenance team checked for serious equipment failures, finding none. Once again, PK-LQP was under their control and out of danger.Īn hour later, Lion Air flight 043 landed in Jakarta, Indonesia, only a few minutes delayed. They followed the checklist and flipped the STAB TRIM switches to CUT OUT on the center console. It was intermittent, temporarily reversible, and it wasn’t even clear if the horizontal stabilizer was causing the problem. Image: Preliminary Aircraft Accident Investigation Report, Lion Air flight 610 Runaway stabilizer checklist for the Boeing 737 Max. The first officer brought the airplane’s nose up a third time. The airplane responded right away, pitching its nose back up. He flicked a switch on his control column to counteract the dive. It lurched downward, its nose pointed toward the ground. He adjusted the throttle, set the aircraft on its optimal climb slope, and retracted the flaps.Įxcept the airplane didn’t climb. Easy.Īll of this took under a minute, and everything appeared to be back to normal.Īt 1,500 feet of altitude, the takeoff portion of the flight was officially complete, and the first officer began the initial climb. So with the turn of a dial, the captain switched the primary displays to only use data from the working sensors on the right side of the airplane. In this case, the captain checked both instrument panels against the backup, and he found that the instruments on his side - the left side - were getting bad data. Each system is fed by an independent set of sensors. In the cockpit, there are three flight computers and digital instrument panels operating in parallel: two primary systems and one backup. Like all commercial aircraft, the Boeing 737 Max has multiple levels of redundancy for its important systems. A Boeing spokesperson said the company believes the system is still “a robust and effective way for the FAA to execute its oversight of safety.” Despite the two crashes, neither Boeing nor the FAA believes they’ve done anything wrong.Even still, Boeing only recommends a 30-minute self-study course for pilots on MCAS, rather than additional simulator or classroom instruction.Nowhere in its amended type certification of the 737 Max is MCAS mentioned. The FAA has admitted to being incompetent when regulating software, and, as a policy, it allows plane manufacturers to police themselves for safety.But its failure in both crashes was the result of Boeing and the Federal Aviation Administration’s reluctance to properly inform pilots of its existence or to regulate it for safety. MCAS is the new software system blamed for the deadly Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines crashes.Since the 737 Max was the same plane type as its predecessors, pilots would only need a 2.5-hour iPad training to fly its newest iteration. In developing the Max, Boeing not only cut corners, but it touted them as selling points for airlines.It rushed the competing 737 Max to market as quickly as possible. Mistakes began nearly a decade ago when Boeing was caught flat-footed after its archrival Airbus announced a new fuel-efficient plane that threatened the company’s core business.
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